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Abstract
Many people do not deliberately act to protect the data on their Smartphones.
The most obvious explanation for a failure to behave securely is that the appro-
priate mechanisms are unusable. Does this mean usable mechanisms will auto-
matically be adopted? Probably not! Poor usability certainly plays a role, but
other factors also contribute to non-adoption of precautionary mechanisms and
behaviours. We carried out a series of interviews to determine justifications for
non-adoption of security precautions, specifically in the smartphone context, and
developed a model of Smartphone precaution non-adoption. We propose that fu-
ture work should investigate the use of media campaigns in raising awareness of
these issues.4
1 Introduction
The usable security field initially identified poor usability as the primary obstacle
preventing adoption of privacy and security measures [29]. Improving usability,
on its own, while necessary, has not proved sufficient in many contexts [10,11,23].
It is necessary to investigate other justifications for non-adoption in the smart-
phone context [27].
We carried out a series of semi-structured interviews to explore possible ex-
planations for non-adoption of smartphone precautions. We derived a model
depicting the progression towards smartphone precaution adoption and report
on it in this paper.
4 This paper has been developed within the project ’ZertApps’, which is funded by
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under grant no.
16KIS0073. The authors assume responsibility for the content.
2 Methodology
We conducted a series of semi-structured interviews either in person or via Skype,
which took, on average, 41 minutes.
2.1 Interview Protocol
Phase 1: Introduction. Welcome, explain what the study is about, gather
demographic data and general information about smartphone experiences.
Phase 2: General security threats. Which security threats they were
aware of, which countermeasures could mitigate, how effective they are, and
whether they had used them. Their vulnerability to attack was explored, as well
as their own experiences of security problems. We also asked about data stored
on smartphones, and responsibility for security.
Phase 3: Specific countermeasures. We explored mechanisms used to
protect sensitive data.
Phase 4: Specific threats. Specific threats were explored, based upon the
guidelines from Federal Office for Information Security5.
2.2 Participants
Twenty Smartphone owners were recruited via email, according to the snowball
principle, with a perfect gender balance ranging from 12 to 65 years of age, with
a mean age of 33.2 years. Ethical requirements for research involving human
participants are provided by an ethics commission at Darmstadt. Participants
were initially told that the study was about smartphone usage and debriefed
afterwards about the real nature of the investigation. Permission was gained
from adults or parents, where applicable, to record the interview anonymously.
2.3 Analysis
To support an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of our interviews
we needed a set of pre-existing themes. Researchers have reported a number of
non-usability related factors that are likely to hinder the adoption of security
and privacy solutions in other contexts [23,11,10,24]. We synthesised a number
of deterrents to adoption and usage:(1) Lack of awareness, (2) Lack of concern,
(3) Lack of self-efficacy, (4) Lack of compulsion and (5) Lack of perseverance.
3 Results
The interviews were transcribed, and responses were analysed using semi-open
coding using the categories enumerated in the previous Section. Two authors
independently reviewed the transcripts and assigned explanations to codes and
codes to categories.
5 https://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
Grundschutz/Download/Ueberblickspapier_Smartphone_pdf
3.1 Lack of Awareness
Participants were either completely unaware, or only aware of threats that re-
quired physical access to their smartphone: “No, I wouldn’t know where I could
have problems here. There might be something, but nothing comes to mind at the
moment” We identified a number of possible explanations for lack of awareness:
It’s a Phone, not a Computer. Participants had not made the mental
connection to the need for precautions, eg: “Yes, I consider it more of a phone.
So, you can make phone calls, write short messages, and it also has the advantage
that you can access the Internet. But, yes, it is mostly for communicating, and
is not like a laptop, where one works or writes stuff, so, I use it in a different
way.”
Poor Media Coverage. Participants complained that attacks on smart-
phones did not get as much media coverage as threats to laptops or desktops.
Most had heard about malware on PCs, but not on smartphones: “I have heard,
or maybe one has heard, on the TV, or has read about, some attacks on compa-
nies, some hackers, but I haven’t heard that this also happens in private life”
3.2 Lack of Concern
Their Own Insignificance. Participants believed that they were not impor-
tant enough to interest attackers, or that they did not have any interesting data
on their smartphones: “Honestly, I personally think that no one would target me,
because I believe that I do not have anything important on my smartphone”
Low Probability of Becoming a Victim. Some participants underesti-
mated their vulnerability; this led to their not behaving securely and not using
privacy-protecting tools: “I simply believe that out of number of internet-banking
users, the number of people that have experienced problems is so small that it
results in small percentage”
Underestimating Consequences. Participants did not seem to anticipate
the concrete harm that could result: “Honestly, I do not have concerns, because
this data may be important for me, mostly personal stuff, but there are no state
secrets in my emails, if someone wants to read them or something, he, in my
opinion, does not get much from it [..]
Some Privacy Violations are Acceptable. For example: “If it is an app
that I absolutely need, then I need to ponder. Then I say, I take it, even though
it is not secure.”
Trust Someone Else to Take Responsibility. Participants named de-
velopers, smartphone providers, play stores and state institutions, as being re-
sponsible: “Ahm, ok, basically, if there are extreme vulnerabilities, also problems,
then I think, it should be regulated legally.[..] that the manufacturers develop the
devices in a way that it is not possible.”
In particular, some overestimated the level of scrutiny by either Apple or
Google. Assuming that malicious apps could not enter the store, they did not
take precautions: “So, I hope at least, that they do this [check the apps], that
they have some filter criteria, so that they do not sell apps that are dubious, but
how well they pay attention to to privacy, I honestly do not know.”
Device Loss is more Worrying Than Privacy. No one mentioned privacy
and only a few mentioned security. Instead a number said that the main problem
would be losing the device itself: “As long as it is not stolen, I do not worry.”;
“So, honestly, I think for me the device itself is more important, because I think,
oh no, it cost so much. I would only think about the data sometime later, and
then worry about my contacts and my images.”
Several mentioned an adversary using their smartphone to make calls or send
text messages, that also would cost them something: “Good, I would immediately
lock the card. So that no one can use it. [...] I would also go to the police, but I
believe this has nothing to do with it.”
3.3 Lack of Self-Efficacy.
People can still fail to act defensively if they do not possess the know-how or
self confidence to take action.
Lack of Knowledge. Some did not seem to know how to protect themselves,
or what actions to take against threats: “I do not know how I could protect myself
from it.”; “I cannot judge at all whether an app is secure or not.”
Others complained about the level of pre-existing security-related knowledge
that was required: “I do not find it very obvious, also what they write about
security, it is never very clear or understandable for laymen, what is allowed and
what is not allowed.” More advanced measures, such as the option to remotely
track the stolen device or wiping data from it, or encryption, were hardly ever
mentioned.
Other participants, demonstrated misconceptions with respect to specific
threats, such as using non-secured WLAN: “I do not have the feeling that any-
one can access my computer or my phone better on non-secured WLAN than on
secured.”
Misplaced Faith in Efficacy of Solutions. Participants believed that
they already used their smartphones securely, and that they did not require
additional measures. For example, they did not use the screen lock since they
always had their phone on their person: “I have my phone always in my pants
pocket, and I believe that no one can easily get it.”
They did not use antivirus software because they believed that their careful
usage of their phone (i.e. not installing many apps) prevented them from getting
a virus: “I consider antivirus software to be important when you download stuff
that you might install on your computer or with which you do something. I do
not do this on the phone at all. So, I read emails, or read news and go on the
internet to look something up, but I never install stuff on my phone. ”
Some believed that since they had not experienced any security issues so far,
it meant that their way of using the smartphone must be secure: “I did not have
any negative experiences on my smartphone, that some trojans or something was
installed on smartphones because there were no antivurus. I can’t recall reading
anything about it. Therefore I didn’t consider it to be important.”
Futility of Precautions. Participants were sceptical about whether the
existing precautionary measures were indeed capable of protecting them. “I think
that at least these big players [Apple, Google, Windows, Blackberry], or one of
them, could attack me if they wanted to.”
Lack of Confidence. Some did not have the confidence to engage with
precautionary measures: “I would need to ask someone to download or install it
for me.”
3.4 Lack of Compulsion
Some, despite being aware of the threats and of the precautionary measures,
cited other factors that kept them from adopting those measures.
Inconvenience. Many referred to the effort that would be required that
would hinder their usage of their smartphone: “Because I am irritated that I
have to constantly enter this, around 50 times a day.”; “I think it is more
secure than the PIN, but it is too effortful.”; “I can suggest that I would not do
it out of a desire for convenience. That is, out of convenience or forgetfulness,
that I forget that I have to do this.”; “Besides, one has to think of new passwords
every time; this is horrible.”
Finally, some did not install essential updates to their operating systems even
though they knew they should. They cited inconvenience: “Yes, since I also have
to work with the device or use it. It is not so, that complete functions are not
available, instead, I can still work with it, and when I have a quiet minute, then
I do the update.”
Negative Past Experiences. Participants expressed concern about exist-
ing solutions hindering the functionality of their smartphones, such as a loss of
data as a result of an update, or antivirus software making the phone work too
slowly: “Antivirus software makes my phone too slow if it runs in the background
all the time, therefore I decline to use it.”
Financial Cost. “There might be some antivirus software that one has to
pay for, I leave it alone. If I somehow find free antivirus software, and I read
that it delivers value, then I would install it”.
3.5 Lack of Perseverance
I Trust What My Friends Do. “Apps that I have on it are just the apps
used by many people, also by many in my social circle. And somehow it creates
trust, so that one thinks, ok, if they all have it, than it must be secure and not
do anything bad.”
Not Wanting to be Paranoid. “On one hand, it to some extent na¨ıvety,
and on the other side, it is to some extent, one can not permanently go on with
such distrust, and always with these thoughts in head, I have to be absolutely
sure, that no data falls in wrong hands. One can also become paranoid with it.”;
“The problem is, that one does not understand the things that they write there,
unless one becomes acquainted with the topic of security, so one could only trust
that whatever is written there is secure.”
4 Model of Precaution Adoption
Based on our findings we have derived a model of smartphone precaution adop-
tion, as depicted in Figure 16. (The subcategory poor media coverage of smart-
phone security issues is new.)
Fig. 1. Categories of explanations for non-adoption in a Smartphone context. Citations
for Sub-categories are those who mentioned a related finding in a different context .
[1,2,4,3,5,6,10,13,12,14,20,21,23,25,26,28]
Not many papers in usable security seem to mention the role of the media.
Some notable exceptions are Furnell and Evangelatos [9] and [18] who do mention
the media’s role with respect to public awareness of biometrics. Certainly this is
an area for future focus if we are to make users more aware of the existence of
smartphone-related threats, and the appropriate precautions to take.
5 Related Work
A study to evaluate how users protect their data on their smartphones was
conducted by Muslukhov et al. [19]. The researchers reported that users tend
to store various types of sensitive data on their smartphones yet many do not
actively protect their data. Lazou and Weir [16] conducted a quantitative study
to evaluate the security practices of smartphone users, the types of sensitive
data stored on the smartphones, and users’ security awareness but did not look
into the reasons for either lack of awareness or failure to use the tools. Other
quantitative studies with similar goals were conducted in [22,21,8].
A great deal of research has been carried out examining app permissions
[7,15,17]. Their results include usability and understandability issues as well
as reasons for non-consideration of permissionsbut they did not address other
smartphone threats.
6 This list of references is not exhaustive due to lack of space
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have known for at least the last 15 years that poor usability deters use
of security-related software. Yet other factors also deter adoption and it is
important to understand the nature of these factors too so that we can ad-
dress them. We identified five context-neutral causative categories from the non-
smartphone literature. We then conducted interviews and analysed them to de-
termine whether these same categories manifested in the smartphone arena. We
did confirm them, and – more interestingly – identified an exhaustive list of
sub-categories in each of the four meta-categories.
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